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I. THE ANTHoNY DECISION
When defendant Harry A. Anthony, Sr. ("Anthony") approached the intersection of State
Route 28/66 and 85 in his Ford Escort on the evening of November 29, 2009, he was observed
by Pennsylvania State Trooper Jeremy Bowser ("Bowser").' Bowser noticed that Anthony had
objects hanging from his rearview mirror in apparent violation of PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
4107(b)(2), 2 and proceeded to follow Anthony.3 Bowser initiated a traffic stop of Anthony at
1. Commonwealth v. Anthony, I A.3d 914, 916 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).
2. Anthony, I A.3d at 916. 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2) provides:
It is unlawful for any person to do any of the following: (2) Operate, or cause or permit another
person to operate, on any highway in this Commonwealth any vehicle or combination which is not
equipped as required under this part or under department regulations or when the driver is in
violation of department regulations or the vehicle or combination is otherwise in an unsafe
condition or in violation of department regulations.
75 Pa. C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2) (2010). Section 4107(b)(2) of the Vehicle Code is implemented at 67 Pa. Code §
175.68(c)(4), which reads: "[n]o object or material may be hung from the rearview mirror and no object or material
may be hung, placed or attached in a position so as to materially obstruct, obscure or impair the driver's vision
through the windshield or constitute a safety hazard." 67 Pa. Code § 175.68(c)(4) (2010).
3. Id.
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approximately 8:10 P.M. due to this alleged violation.4 As he approached Anthony's vehicle,
Bowser detected a strong smell of alcohol and observed an open case of beer in the back seat of
Anthony's car. s After discovering that Anthony's license was under a DUI-related suspension,
Bowser placed Anthony under arrest and transported him back to the state police barracks. 6
Approximately an hour after initiating the traffic stop, Bowser gave Anthony a portable
breath test for alcohol, which resulted in a .000% reading.7  Thereafter, Bowser performed a
Miranda reading and continued questioning Anthony about his possible drug use.8 Anthony
admitted to smoking marijuana earlier that day, which prompted Bowser to contact Trooper
Ronald Vetovich, Jr. ("Vetovich"), the state police's certified drug recognition expert, to perform
a drug recognition evaluation ("DRE") of Anthony. 9 At the completion of the DRE, Vetovich
concluded that Anthony was under the influence of drugs to the extent that he was unable to
safely operate a vehicle.10 Ultimately, Bowser placed Anthony under arrest for DUI based upon
Vetovich's findings and Anthony's incriminating statements.11
Anthony filed an omnibus pre-trial motion in an effort to suppress the evidence gathered
pursuant to the traffic stop.12 This motion was premised upon the assertion that Bowser failed to
4. Id. Bowser did not observe any other traffic violations or notice that Anthony was not driving
safely. Id.
5. Id. Bowser also discovered that Anthony's passenger had an outstanding warrant on a felony
charge. Id. After calling for backup, the passenger was taken into custody. Id.
6. Id. When Anthony exited the vehicle, Bowser noticed two open containers of beer in the car. Id.
Furthermore, after being read his Miranda warnings and signing a written waiver, Anthony admitted to drinking
while driving and taking a 500 milligram Vicodin pill, which was not prescribed. Id.
7. Anthony, 1 A.3d at 917.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. In the one-leg stand test, Anthony swayed while balancing and had to be told to look at his
foot while counting. Id. Anthony was also somewhat impaired in his concurrent counting of time. Id. In the
finger-to-nose test, Anthony twice failed to touch the tip of his nose. Id.
11. Id. Thereafter, Anthony agreed to have his blood drawn and was then taken to the hospital. Id.
The toxicology report indicated that his blood tested positive for benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of cocaine and a
DEA Schedule 11 controlled drug) and "cocaine cross-reactives." Id. There was no positive identification in his
blood for marijuana, opiates, amphetamines, barbiturates, or alcohol at the time the sample was taken. Id.
12. Anthony, 1 A.3d at 918.
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possess a reasonable suspicion that Anthony was in violation of section 4107(b)(2) prior to
conducting the stop.13  After an evidentiary hearing, Anthony's motion was denied and the
matter advanced to a non-jury trial, where Judge James J. Panchik found Anthony guilty of three
counts of DUI-Controlled Substances based on the metabolites present in his bloodstream and
his impaired driving condition.14 The trial court also found Anthony guilty of a summary offense
under section 4107(b)(2) due to the objects hanging from his mirror.15
After sentencing Anthony to a prison term ranging from ninety days to five years in the
Armstrong County Jail,16 the court released him on his own recognizance and stayed execution
on the sentence pending appeal.' 7 The issues before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania were as
follows: (1) whether the trial court committed error when it denied Anthony's pretrial motion
alleging a lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion necessary for an officer to perform a
traffic stop; and (2) whether the evidence was insufficient to convict Anthony of DUI-
Impairment when the record did not show that Anthony was under the influence of drugs.' 8
On appeal, the superior court held that the traffic stop was unlawful, thus requiring the
suppression of the evidence seized therefrom. 19  In doing so, the court recognized that the
Pennsylvania Vehicle Code sets forth "reasonable suspicion," rather than "probable cause," as
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The objects in question were three air fresheners hanging from Anthony's interior rearview
mirror. Id. at 920.
16. Id. The court imposed sentence on the DUI-Impairment conviction under 75 Pa. C.S.A. §
3802(d)(2), which reads:
An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle
under any of the following circumstances: (2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual's ability to safely drive, operate or
be in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2) (2010).
17. Anthony, I A.3d at 918.
18. Id. (citing Brief for the Appellant, at 2).
19. Id. at 921.
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the threshold standard for determining the legality of a traffic stop.20 The court indicated that
grounds for reasonable suspicion are established by articulating specific observations which
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that criminal activity is occurring.21
The court proceeded to address Anthony's reliance on two earlier superior court
decisions, Commonwealth v. Benton22 and Commonwealth v. Felty,23 which determined under
what conditions an officer may stop a motorist for suspected violation of section 4524(c) of the
Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.24 In Felty and Benton, the superior court held that the presence of
objects hanging from a motorist's rearview mirror constitute reasonable suspicion if the objects
appear to materially obstruct the driver's vision.25 Although Bowser stopped Anthony for an
alleged violation of section 4107(b)(2), the court agreed with Anthony's contention that the
language of section 4107(b)(2) tracks that of section 4524(c),26 the section applied in both Felty
20. Id. at 919 (citing 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308(b) (2010)).
21. Id. See Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (citing Commonwealth
v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1999)). Specifically, the court stated:
[T]o establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must articulate specific observations
which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him
reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that the
person he stopped was involved in that activity.
Id. (quoting Reppert, 814 A.2d at 1203).
22. 655 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
23. 662 A.2d 1102 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). In Benton and Felty, incriminating evidence produced
during a post-traffic stop search of the defendants' vehicles was suppressed on appeal. Benton, 655 A.2d 1030;
Felty, 662 A.2d 1102. In both cases, the Superior Court determined that the arresting officers failed to possess
"reasonable and articulable grounds" to believe that certain objects hanging from the defendants' rearview mirrors
"materially obstructed, obscured or impaired" their vision pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(c) and 75 Pa.C.S. §
6308(b). Benton, 655 A.2d at 1034; Felty, 662 A.2d at 1106.
24. Anthony, 1 A.3d at 920. Although both 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 4524(c) and 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2)
are both found in the Vehicle Code, the former specifically addresses "Windshield obstruction and wipers" whereas
the latter, the statute at issue in Anthony, concerns "Unlawful activities" generally and is implemented at 67 Pa.
Code § 175.68(c)(4) of the administrative code. Id.
25. Id. (quoting 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 4524(c)).
26. 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 4524(c) provides:
No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any object or material hung from the inside rearview
mirror or otherwise hung, placed or attached in such a position as to materially obstruct, obscure
or impair the driver's vision through the front windshield or any manner as to constitute a safety
hazard.
75 Pa. C.S.A. § 4524(c) (2010) (emphasis added).
4
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and Benton.27 Consequently, the court concluded that to sustain a stop under section 4107(b)(2),
the arresting officer's observations must raise a reasonable suspicion that the object materially
obstructs the driver's vision through the front windshield.28
The court applied the foregoing standard and determined that Bowser did not possess a
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the perceived objects hanging from
Anthony's rearview window materially obstructed his vision.29 In reaching this conclusion, the
court scrutinized the testimony of Bowser at Anthony's suppression hearing. 30 After admitting
that he made his observations after dark with only the aid of a street light, Bowser stated that he
merely observed an object hanging from Anthony's rearview mirror.31 Furthermore, when asked
to give a description of the nature and size of the object, Bowser answered that it was probably
six to eight inches tall and maybe three, four inches wide. 32
Upon review of this testimony, the court maintained that Bowser was unable to perceive
the nature of the object-three standard pine-tree shaped air fresheners-and reasoned that his
observations were merely a product of the stop itself.33 The court concluded that Bowser failed
to convey specific observations in support of a reasonable suspicion that Anthony's air
fresheners materially impaired his vision. 34 Thus, it held the stop unlawful and reversed




30. Anthony, I A.3d at 920-21.
31. Id at 21 (citing Def.'s Omnibus Pretrial Mot. 17). Bowser testified that he made his observations
after dark only with the aid of street lighting. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Def.'s Omnibus Pretrial Mot. 18).
33. Id. (citing Def.'s Omnibus Pretrial Mot. 18). Hanging in no particular sequence from Anthony's
rearview mirror were three pine-tree shaped air fresheners. Id.
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II. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE ANTHONY DECISION
Under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
citizens are protected against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by federal and state
governments.36 Although the Fourth Amendment has commonly been interpreted as requiring a
warrant supported by probable cause to effectuate a lawful search and seizure, the Supreme
Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio carved out a narrow exception to this requirement. 37 In Terry,
the Court concluded that police may briefly detain an individual for purposes of investigation in
circumstances where specific and articulable grounds exist to reasonably suspect that criminal
activity is in progress.38
Since Terry, the Pennsylvania legislature has expanded this limited probable cause
exception beyond situations involving a "stop and frisk."39 Traditionally, however, probable
cause was the standard applied by Pennsylvania courts in the context of traffic stops. 40 In
Commonwealth v. Swanger, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
"routine" traffic stop, without any cause, was in contravention of the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, Section 8. 41 Upon recognizing that a vehicle and its occupants are, in effect, "seized"
36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated [...]" Id.; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8. "The
people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures
[..]" Id.
37. 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968).
38. Terry, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. "[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime."
Id. The Court then went on to state, "in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due
weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Id.
39. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308 (2010).
40. Commonwealth v. Swanger, 307 A.2d 875 (Pa. 1973).
41. Swanger, 307 A.2d at 876-77 (citing Terry, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968); Commonwealth v. Pollard, 299 A.2d 233 (1973)). After two Pennsylvania state police officers stopped the
car in which the defendant was a passenger for a "routine" check, they discovered burglary tools on the floor.
Swanger, 307 A.2d at 876. A subsequent investigation then connected the defendant with a recent burglary and he
was thereafter charged with such. Id.
6
Duquesne Criminal Law Journal, Vol. 2 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://ddc.duq.edu/dclj/vol2/iss2/10
Commonwealth v. Anthony
during a traffic stop, the court concluded that the "routine" stop in question did violate the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.42 The court then held that
police must have probable cause based on specific facts to believe that a vehicle or its driver has
violated the Vehicle Code before conducting a traffic stop. 43
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a similar holding several years later in
Commonwealth v. Murray. 44 This case is factually similar to Swanger, as the police stopped the
defendant's car in connection with a nearby burglary, despite the fact that the defendant had not
violated any traffic laws. 45 The court applied the probable cause standard set forth in Swanger46
and determined that there were no facts from which the officers could have reasonably concluded
that criminal activity was occurring. 47 In light of this determination, the court ultimately held
that the stop was unlawful due to the officers' lack of probable cause, and it suppressed the
evidence produced therefrom. 48
In response to the holdings in both Swanger and Murray, the legislature enacted 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 6308,49 which prescribed "articulable and reasonable grounds" as the threshold for a
lawful traffic stop in Pennsylvania.50 Through section 6308, the legislature attempted to lower
42. Id. at 878. At the time of this decision, the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1221(b), permitted
police officers to stop a motor vehicle without any indication that the vehicle or its driver was in violation of the
Code. Commonwealth v. McElroy, 630 A.2d 35, 38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
43. Id. at 879. More specifically, the court stated, "before a police officer may stop a single vehicle to
determine whether or not the vehicle is being operated in compliance with The Vehicle Code, he must have probable
cause based on specific facts which indicate to him either the vehicle or driver is in violation of the code." Swanger,
307 A.2d at 879.
44. 331 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1975).
45. Murray, 331 A.2d at 416. The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged on two counts of
burglary, conspiracy, possession of burglary tools, receiving stolen goods and larceny. Id. at 415.
46. Id. at 414. From the outset, the court maintained, "it is encumbent upon the officer to articulate
specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe
that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code." Id. (citing Swanger, 307 A.2d at 879)
(emphasis in the original).
47. Id. at 419.
48. Id.
49. McElroy, 630 A.2d at 38.
50. 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308(b) (1983). As first enacted, § 6308 provided:
87 Vol. 2:2
7
Sarver: To Justify a Lawful Traffic Stop in Pennsylvania, Law Enforcement
Published by Duquesne Scholarship Collection, 2011
Duquesne Criminal Law Journal
the requisite suspicion necessary to conduct a lawful traffic stop in Pennsylvania.5 1 However,
despite section 6308's departure from the previous "probable cause to believe" framework, the
two standards were applied interchangeably by Pennsylvania courts. 52
In Commonwealth v. Lopez, the superior court cited both Swanger and Murray in
reaching its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment requires the police to possess "articulable
and reasonable grounds to suspect," or "probable cause to believe," that criminal activity may be
taking place. 53 In a similar manner, the superior court in Commonwealth v. Whitmyer rejected
the Commonwealth's contention that "reasonable suspicion to believe" is the appropriate
standard in the traffic stop arena and stated that "probable cause" or "articulable and reasonable
grounds to suspect" were the proper standards. 54
Notwithstanding these holdings, the superior court in Commonwealth v. McElroy rejected
the notion that the two terms could be used interchangeably, and expressly adopted "articulable
and reasonable grounds to suspect" as used in section 6308(b) as the preferred standard for
traffic stops.55 In 1995's Commonwealth v. Benton, the superior court considered the legality of
a traffic stop premised upon air fresheners hanging from the defendant's rearview mirror in
suspected violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(c).56  The Benton court noted that a perceived
Authority of Police Officer. --Whenever a police officer . . .has articulable and reasonable grounds
to suspect a violation of this title, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of
checking the vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number
or engine number or driver's license, or to secure such other information as the officer may
reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
Id.
51. McElroy, 630 A.2d at 38.
52. Id.
53. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 609 A.2d 177, 180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (citing Swanger, 307 A.2d
875; Murray, 331 A.2d 414).
54. 609 A.2d 809, 812-13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
55. McElroy, 630 A.2d at 39. In doing so, the court stated, "we seek to avoid any confusion which
may be caused by the use of the term 'probable cause' to describe and assess those police encounters with citizens
which do not rise to the level of an arrest or search." Id.
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violation of section 4524(c) must be supported by a reasonable belief that the objects materially
obstruct the driver's vision through the front windshield.57  The court relied heavily on the
arresting officer's testimony, which reflected his inability to specifically identify or describe the
objects he observed, and concluded that he failed to possess a reasonable belief that the objects
materially obstructed the defendant's view in accordance with section 4524(c).58
The superior court's conclusion in Benton was then bolstered several months later by its
holding in Commonwealth v. Felty.59 The Felty court addressed the similar issue of whether the
arresting officers possessed reasonable and articulable grounds to believe that an object hanging
from the defendant's rearview mirror was in violation of section 4524(c).60 As it did in Benton,
the court ultimately determined that the officers' inability to convey a clear description of the
object, and ascertain whether it obstructed the driver's vision, was insufficient to justify the stop
of the defendant's car. 61 In accord with this determination, the court held the stop unlawful and
remanded the case with instructions to suppress the illegally seized evidence. 62
57. Benton, 655 A.2d at 1034. The court noted that, "[t]he plain language of the statute [75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 4524] [...] makes unlawful only those items which materially obstruct, obscure or impair a driver's vision." Id. It
then indicated that a traffic stop is only warranted when the police officer possesses "reasonable and articulable
grounds for believing a Section 5424 violation occurred." Id. This standard does not require that an actual violation
be established. Id. at 1033 (citing McElroy, 630 A.2d 35). Furthermore, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 5424(c) reads:
No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any object or material hung from the inside rearview
mirror or otherwise hung, placed or attached in such a position as to materially obstruct, obscure
or impair the driver's vision through the front windshield or any manner as to constitute a safety
hazard.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 5424(c) (2010).
58. Id. at 1033-34. When asked at the suppression hearing whether the object he saw was an air
freshener, the arresting officer stated that he could not tell. Id. (citing Suppression Hearing Transcript at 27-3 1).
Additionally, when asked numerous times to describe its size, shape, and color, the officer was unable to do so. Id.
(citing Suppression Hearing Transcript at 27-31). The court emphasized the fact that section 4524(c) does not
prohibit the hanging of objects from the rear view mirror; rather, it prohibits those objects which "materially
obstruct, obscure or impair" the driver's vision. Id. at 1032 (citing 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 7524).
59. Felty, 662 A.2d 1102.
60. Id. at 1105. Also at issue in this case was whether the behavior of the passengers in the car
supplied the officers with reasonable and articulable grounds to stop the defendant's car. Id.
61. Id. at 1105-06. The court further noted that the officer failed to mention or describe the object in
his police report. Id.
62. Id. at 1106.
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Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified the matter in Commonwealth v.
Whitmyer when it declared that the language of section 6308 could be interpreted to mean
nothing less than "probable cause." 63 The court balanced the safety interest of the government
against the privacy interest of the individual being searched, and concluded that there was no
substantive difference between the two standards. 64
On account of this decision, the Pennsylvania legislature amended section 6308(b) of the
65Vehicle Code in 2004. The primary change involved the replacement of the phrase "articulable
and reasonable ground to suspect" with "reasonable suspicion," thereby lowering the statutory
level of suspicion necessary for a police officer to execute a lawful traffic stop, as it attempted to
do in 1977.66 Since this amendment, however, the cases addressing constitutionality of section
6308(b) have primarily addressed DUI-related traffic stops. 67  In light of this fact, and the
government's compelling interest in detecting and removing intoxicated drivers from the roads,
section 6308(b)'s lower standard has since been upheld at the superior court level.68
63. 668 A.2d, 1113, 1116 (Pa. 1995) (emphasis added).
64. Whitmyer, 668 A.2d at 1116. "[W]hen we balance the underlying interests of the individual and
the government, the two standards amount to nothing more than a distinction without a difference." Id. (emphasis
added).
65. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (2010). Section 6308(b) now reads:
(b) Authority of police officer.--Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of
checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or
has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the
vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
number or the driver's license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably
believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); Commonwealth v. Ulman, 902
A.2d 514 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
68. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). More particularly, the Sands court noted,
"[b]ecause of the severe consequences of drunken driving in terms of roadway deaths, injuries, and property
damage,...the government has a compelling interest in detecting intoxicated drivers and removing them from the
roads before they cause injury." Id.
10
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ANTHoNY DECISION
In consideration of the reasonable suspicion standard currently set forth in 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
6308(b), it is fair to conclude that the superior court's analysis in Anthony achieved a fair balance
between the government's interest in detecting intoxicated drivers and the protection of
Anthony's Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 rights. Despite the theoretically lower
standard embodied in the phrase "reasonable suspicion," the Anthony court's interpretation and
application of section 6308(b) remained, in many ways, predicated upon the statute's previous
standard of "articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect." 69
The superior court indicated that a lawful traffic stop still requires the officer's capacity
to articulate specific facts and observations which warrant a reasonable belief that criminal
activity is afoot. 70 This standard was then aptly applied by the Anthony court in reaching its
conclusion that Officer Bowser, prior to making the stop, failed to establish a reasonable
suspicion that Anthony was in violation of the Vehicle Code.7  As it did in both Benton and
Felty, the court relied on the officer's inability to describe the nature and size of the objects
hanging from Anthony's rearview mirror to support its decision. 72
However, had the court not been persuaded by defense counsel's argument that the level
of observation necessary to establish grounds for reasonable suspicion under section 4524(c) was
controlling for section 4107(b)(2), 73 the same conclusion might not have been reached. In this
regard, the court's incorporation of the administrative code somewhat offset section 6308(b)'s
69. Lopez, 609 A.2d 177.
70. Reppert, 814 A.2d at 1204 (citing Commonwealth v. Cooke, 735 A.2d 673, 677 (Pa. 1999)
(involving an officer's pursuit and subsequent search of a fleeing suspect). In Reppert, the search in question
occurred after the officer executed a valid traffic stop due to expired inspection and registration stickers. Id. at 1199.
71. Id.
72. Anthony, 1 A.3d at 921.
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lower statutory standard by prescribing a threshold level of observation; namely that objects
hanging from a car's rearview mirror must appear to materially obstruct the driver's vision
through the front windshield before a lawful stop may be executed.
The decision to incorporate the administrative code thus refuted the idea that ambivalent
observations, such as those made by Bowser, may satisfy the requisite suspicion set forth in
section 6308(b). By holding the stop unlawful, the Anthony court reaffirmed the notion that
"reasonable suspicion" involves more than just an arbitrary belief. Rather, it entails pointing to
specific facts and rationally concluding therefrom that it is more likely than not that a violation
of the Vehicle Code has occurred, and that the person targeted is the subject of that violation. 74
Although the court's extension of its holdings in both Benton and Felty blurred the
distinction between "reasonable suspicion" and "articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect,"
it remains clear that the heightened standard of probable cause traditionally applied to traffic
stops in Pennsylvania has, in effect, been eradicated. The constitutionality of this change has yet
to be determined beyond the scope of DUI-related stops. But the government's compelling
interest in making such stops, which was the catalyst for section 6308(b)'s amendment, will
likely support its validity in the foreseeable future.75 Moreover, if Pennsylvania courts continue
to apply the statute as the superior court did in Anthony, the seemingly lower standard embodied
in section 6308(b) should survive challenges to its constitutionality.
Shane Sarver
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